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Abstract
We consider a stochastic linear bandit problem in which the rewards are not only
subject to random noise, but also adversarial attacks subject to a suitable budget C
(i.e., an upper bound on the sum of corruption magnitudes across the time horizon).
We provide two variants of a Robust Phased Elimination algorithm, one that knows
C and one that does not. Both variants are shown to attain near-optimal regret in the
non-corrupted case C = 0, while incurring additional additive terms respectively
having a linear and quadratic dependency on C in general. We present algorithm-
independent lower bounds showing that these additive terms are near-optimal. In
addition, in a contextual setting, we revisit a setup of diverse contexts, and show
that a simple greedy algorithm is provably robust with a near-optimal additive
regret term, despite performing no explicit exploration and not knowing C.
1 Introduction
Over the past years, bandit algorithms have found application in computational advertising, rec-
ommender systems, clinical trials, and many more. These algorithms make online decisions by
balancing between exploiting previously high-reward actions vs. exploring less known ones that could
potentially lead to higher rewards. Bandit problems can roughly be categorized [16] into stochastic
bandits, in which subsequently played actions yield independent rewards, and adversarial bandits,
where the rewards are chosen by an adversary, possibly subject to constraints. A recent line of works
has sought to reap the benefits of both approaches by studying bandit problems that are stochastic
in nature, but with rewards subject to a limited amount of adversarial corruption. Various works
have developed provably robust algorithms [10, 22, 4, 19], and attacks have been designed that cause
standard algorithms to fail [8, 10, 11, 20].
While near-optimal theoretical guarantees have been established in the case of independent arms [10],
more general settings remain relatively poorly understood or even entirely unexplored; see Section
1.2 for details. Our primary goal is to bridge these gaps via a detailed study of stochastic linear
bandits with adversarial corruptions. In the case of a fixed finite (but possibly very large) set of arms,
we develop an elimination-based robust algorithm and provide regret bounds with a near-optimal joint
dependence on the time horizon and the adversarial attack budget, demonstrating distinct behavior
depending on whether the attack budget is known or unknown. In addition, we introduce a novel
contextual linear bandit setting under adversarial corruptions, and show that under a context diversity
assumption, a simple greedy algorithm attains near-optimal regret under adversarial corruptions,
despite having no built-in mechanism that explicitly encourages exploration or robustness.
1.1 Problem Setting
We consider the stochastic linear bandit setting with a given set of arms A0 ⊂ Rd of finite size k, and
adversarially corrupted rewards. At each round t ∈ {1, . . . , T}:
• The learner chooses an action At ∈ A0.
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• The adversary observes At and decides upon the attack/corruption ct(At); in addition, ct(·)
may (implicitly) depend on other problem parameters, as detailed below.
• The learner receives a corrupted reward Yt such that
Yt = 〈θ,At〉+ t + ct(At), (1)
where θ ∈ Rd is an unknown parameter vector, and (t)Tt=1 is a random noise term, which is
assumed to be zero-mean and 1-sub-Gaussian.
We assume that the action feature vectors are unique, span Rd, and are bounded, i.e., ‖a‖2 ≤ 1,∀a ∈
A0. We similarly make the standard assumption ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1, which implies that |〈θ, a〉| ≤ 1,∀a ∈ A0.
We consider an adversary/attacker that has complete knowledge of the problem – it knows both A0
and θ, and observes both the precise arm pulled and the noise realization t before choosing its attack.
The total attack budget of the adversary is given by
∑T
t=1 |ct(At)| ≤ C. We will consider both the
cases that C is known and unknown to the learner.
The goal of the learner is to minimize the cumulative regret, defined as
RT =
T∑
t=1
max
a∈A0
〈θ, a−At〉. (2)
Broadly speaking, we say that an algorithm that attains low regret (e.g., sublinear scalingRT = o(T ))
is corruption-tolerant or robust to adversarial attacks.
1.2 Related Work
Recent surveys on bandit algorithms can be found in [16, 25]; here we focus on the most relevant
works considering stochastic settings with adversarial corruptions and bandit attacks. Some additional
related work is discussed in Appendix F.
Adversarial attacks on standard bandit algorithms (e.g., UCB, -greedy, and Thompson sampling)
were introduced for the case of independent arms (i.e., a classical multi-armed bandit setting) in
[11, 20, 21], and for linear bandits in [8]. We will use the latter in our experiments to test robustness
of the proposed algorithms, along with other heuristic attacks.
In the case of independent arms, Lykouris et al. [22] show that a simple elimination algorithm with
enlarged confidence bounds is robust and near-optimal when the attack budget C is known. For
unknown C, randomized algorithm is given whose regret bound roughly amounts to scaling the
uncorrupted regret by C, i.e., multiplicative dependence. Subsequently, Gupta et al. [10] establish an
improved algorithm whose regret bound is near-optimal, with an additive dependence on C.
Bogunovic et al. [4] consider corruption-tolerant bandits for functions with a bounded RKHS norm,
which includes linear bandits as a special case. The algorithm of [4] is based on that of [22], and
has analogous guarantees. However, even in the case of known C, the best dependence obtained is
multiplicative; the possibility of additive dependence was left as an open problem.
Li et al. [19] also study stochastic linear bandits with adversarial corruptions. A distinction in [19] is
that the regret bounds are instance-dependent, relying on positive gaps between the function values at
corner points of the polyhedral domain. These results are complementary to the instance-independent
bounds with a finite number of arms that we seek in this paper, and neither can be deduced from
the other; see [4, App. K] for a detailed discussion. Finally, we conclude this section by noting that
the previously mentioned works [22, 10, 4, 19] consider a weaker adversary that cannot observe the
current action which is often assumed when designing efficient bandit attacks [11, 20].
1.3 Contributions
Our main contributions are as follows:
• For known C, we present a Robust Phased Elimination algorithm, and show that it recovers a
near-optimal regret bound when C = 0, while incurring an additive O(d3/2C log T ) term (up
to log log(dT ) factors) more generally. A standard lower bound argument [22] shows that Ω(C)
dependence is unavoidable, thus certifying the upper bound as being optimal up to log factors.
• For unknown C, we modify our algorithm to gradually decrease its confidence bound enlarge-
ment term over time, and show that we only pay a further O(C2) term compared to the known
2
C case. We also provide a novel algorithm-independent lower bound showing that the C2
dependence is unavoidable for any algorithm that attains the usual non-corrupted bound in the
case C = 0. Thus, we again establish the near-optimality of our regret bounds, and demonstrate
a fundamental gap between the known C and unknown C settings.
• We introduce a linear contextual problem with adversarial attacks, and show that under the
model of diverse contexts from [12], the greedy algorithm not only attains near-optimal regret
in the uncorrupted setting (as shown in [12]), but is also robust to adversarial attacks.
2 Algorithm and Regret Bounds
We present our Robust Phased Elimination algorithm in Algorithm 1, which builds on non-robust
elimination algorithms [16, 17, 27] (see Appendix F for further discussion). The known C vs. un-
known C variants only differ on Line 1. The algorithm runs in epochs of exponentially increasing
length and maintains a set of potentially optimal actions. In every epoch, the following steps are
performed: (i) compute a near-optimal experimental design over a set of potentially optimal actions,
and play each action from this subset in proportion to the computed design (Lines 2-4); (ii) compute
an estimate of θ, and use it to eliminate actions that appear suboptimal (Lines 5-6). We proceed by
describing these steps in more detail.
Action selection. To introduce the action selection procedure, consider the problem of finding a
probability distribution ζ : A → [0, 1] that solves the following:
minimizeζ maxa∈A‖a‖2Γ(ζ)−1 s.t.
∑
a∈A
ζ(a) = 1, (3)
where Γ(ζ) =
∑
a∈A ζ(a)aa
T , and ‖a‖M =
√
aTMa. A classical result from [14] states that the
optimal solution ζ∗ exists, and achieves maxa∈A ‖a‖2Γ(ζ∗)−1 = d with |supp(ζ∗)| ≤ d(d+1)2 . For our
purposes, however, it suffices to solve the problem in (3) only near-optimally. As noted in [17], there
exists a near-optimal design of smaller support than d(d+ 1)/d. In particular, if A spans Rd,1 then
we can efficiently compute ζ : A → [0, 1] such that
max
a∈A
‖a‖2Γ(ζ)−1 ≤ 2d and |supp(ζ)| ≤ 4d(log log d+ 18) (4)
This follows from [26, Proposition 3.17], who provide a polynomial-time Frank-Wolfe algorithm.
Hence, in every epoch h, the algorithm recomputes a near-optimal design from (4) over a subset of
the actions that are still potentially optimal, i.e., Ah. It then plays each action from this subset in
proportion to the computed design, but it also makes sure that every arm in its support is played at
least some minimal number of times dνmhe, where ν is an input truncation parameter to be chosen
below, and mh is an exponentially increasing parameter proportional to the epoch length.
Parameter estimation and arm elimination. Consider the estimator given in (6). This estimator
only depends on the observations received in the current epoch, and hence, it is not affected by attacks
suffered during previous epochs. However, it can still be biased due to the adversarial attacks suffered
in the current epoch, and we need to account for this bias. In Lemma 4 (Appendix A), for any of the
remaining potentially optimal actions, we bound the difference of the true mean reward and estimated
one, and show that this error grows linearly with the total attack budget C. Hence, the algorithm
makes use of the enlarged confidence bounds in (7) to retain potentially optimal arms. Moreover,
we show that when C is known, our estimator is guaranteed to have sufficient accuracy so that the
optimal arm is always retained in (7) with high probability. For unknown C, this is not always the
case, but we can control the level of suboptimality of the arms that are retained.
The estimator of θ is robust due to the fact that it averages the rewards that correspond to the same
played action, which reduces the effect of the attack. Intuitively, actions that have higher importance
according to the found near-optimal design are played more times than others. Consequently, it is
harder for the adversary to corrupt them as it needs to use more of the attack budget. In addition, due
to the introduced truncation, the algorithm plays each arm in the support of the computed design a
fixed minimum number of times.
Remark 1. The following observations from [17] are useful: (i) While (4) is stated assuming the
arms span Rd, we can simply work in the lower-dimensional subspace otherwise (e.g., when k < d);
(ii) We can extend the algorithm and its analysis to infinite-arm settings using a covering argument.
1See Remark 1 below for the general case.
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Algorithm 1 Robust Phased Elimination
Require: Actions A0 ⊂ Rd, confidence δ ∈ (0, 1), truncation parameter ν ∈ (0, 1), time horizon T
1: Initialize2 m0 = 4d(log log d + 18), and for each h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , log2 T − 1}, set Cˆh = C for
known C, or Cˆh = min{
√
T
m0 log2 T
,m0
√
d2log2 T−h} for unknown C. Initialize h = 0.
2: Compute design ζh : Ah → [0, 1] such that
max
a∈Ah
‖a‖2Γ(ζh)−1 ≤ 2d and |supp(ζh)| ≤ 4d(log log d+ 18). (5)
3: Set uh(a) = 0 if ζh(a) = 0, and uh(a) = dmh max{ζh(a), ν}e otherwise.
4: Take each action a ∈ Ah exactly uh(a) times with corresponding features (At)uht=1 and rewards
(Yt)
uh
t=1 (implicitly depending on h), where uh =
∑
a∈Ah uh(a).
5: Estimate the parameter vector θˆh:
θˆh = Γ
−1
h
uh∑
t=1
Atuh(At)
−1 ∑
s∈T (At)
Ys, Γh =
∑
a∈Ah
uh(a)aa
T , (6)
where T (a) = {s ∈ {1, . . . , uh} : As = a} is the set of times at which arm a is played.
6: Update the active set of arms:
Ah+1 ←
{
a ∈ Ah : max
a′∈Ah
〈θˆh, a′ − a〉 ≤ 2
√
4d
mh
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 2Cˆhmhν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
}
. (7)
7: Set mh+1 ← 2mh, h← h+ 1 and return to step 2 (terminating after T total arm pulls).
2.1 Upper Bounds on Regret
We first provide a regret bound for the known C case, proved in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. For any attack budget C ≥ 0, with probability at least 1 − δ, the Robust Phased
Elimination algorithm with known C and truncation parameter ν = 14d(log log d+18) satisfies
RT = O˜
(√
dT log
(
k
δ
)
+ Cd3/2 log T
)
, (8)
where the notation O˜(·) hides log log(dT ) factors.
When C = 0, we recover the scaling of [16, Thm. 22.1], which is near-optimal in light of known
lower bounds [7]. In Section 2.2, we will argue that the second term is also near-optimal.
Next, we consider the case that the total attack budget C is unknown to the learner. We start
by discussing the choice of Cˆh in Algorithm 1. Let H be the number of epochs, and note that
H˜ = log2 T be a deterministic upper bound on H (see Appendix A.2 for a short proof). Then,
the choice in Algorithm 1 can be rewritten as Cˆh = min{
√
T
m0 log2 T
,m0
√
d2H˜−h}. Observe that
the epochs’ lengths uh and corruption thresholds Cˆh are exponentially increasing and decreasing,
respectively. It follows that the algorithm is more cautious/robust in early epochs (i.e., uses larger
thresholds). Our second main result stated is as follows, and proved in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. For any C ≤
√
T
4d(log log d+18) log T , with probability at least 1 − δ, the Robust Phased
Elimination algorithm with unknown C and truncation parameter ν = 14d(log log d+18) satisfies
RT = O˜
(√
dT log
(
k
δ
)
+ Cd3/2 log T + C2
)
. (9)
This result matches that of Theorem 1, but with an additional penalty of C2. In fact, due to this
penalty, the regret bound (9) trivially holds when C = Ω(
√
T ), because we have RT ≤ 2T due
to our assumption of bounded rewards. If d = ω(1), then there still remains the regime where√
T
(d log log d) log T  C 
√
T , but in any case, one can slightly increase the final term and state that
2When d = 1, we have log log d = −∞, but the results hold with log log d replaced by log(1 + log d).
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RT = O˜
(√
dT log
(
k
δ
)
+ Cd3/2 log T + C2d2(log T )2
)
for arbitrary C. The question remains of
whether the C2 dependence is optimal; we provide a positive answer in the following.
2.2 Algorithm-Independent Lower Bounds on Regret
Using the same reasoning as the standard multi-armed bandit setting [22], it is straightforward to see
that Ω(C) regret is unavoidable: The adversary can simply shift all rewards to zero for the first C
rounds, and the learner cannot do better than random guessing. For completeness, this argument is
given in more detail in Appendix C. This argument holds even when C is known, and thus, we see
that the second term in Theorem 1 is optimal up to at most an O˜(log T ) factor for fixed d. We expect
that an improvement on the d3/2 dependence may be possible, but the following result, proved in
Appendix C, shows that at least Ω(Cd) is unavoidable.
Theorem 3. For any dimension d, there exists an instance with k = d such that any algorithm (even
with knowledge of C) must incur Ω(Cd) regret with probability at least 12 .
Next, we provide another lower bound that allows us to claim that in a sense the regret bound of
Theorem 2 is near-optimal when C is unknown.
Theorem 4. For d = 2 and k = 2, for any algorithm that guarantees RT ≤ R¯(0)T with probability at
least 1− δ for some uncorrupted regret bound R¯(0)T ≤ T16 when C = 0, there exists an instance in
which RT = Ω(T ) with probability at least 1− δ when the attack budget is C = 2R¯(0)T .
The proof is given in Appendix C. While we focus on the simplest case d = k = 2, the proof can
also be adapted to more general choices.
Discussion. Consider the general goal of attaining a regret upper bound of the form
RT ≤ R¯(0)T + f(C) log T, (10)
for some f(·) satisfying f(0) = 0. Here we let the second term contain a log T factor in accordance
with our upper bounds, but the following discussion still applies with only minor modifications when
the log T factor is changed to poly(log T ) or similar.
At first glance, it appears that f(C) should ideally be linear in C, and R¯(0)T should ideally be an
order-optimal regret bound for the non-corrupted setting. However, Theorem 4 shows that we
cannot have both terms exhibiting their “ideal” behavior simultaneously. To see this, note that the
ideal uncorrupted regret bound behaves as R¯(0)T = Θ˜(
√
T ) (for fixed d, k, and δ) [7, 16]. Then,
to be consistent with Theorem 4, we require f(C) log T = Ω˜(T ) for C = Θ(
√
T ), and hence
f(C) = Ω˜
(
C2
logC
)
. On the other hand, it may be possible to avoid the C2 dependence (i.e., improve
robustness) at the expense of a worse uncorrupted regret. This idea is left for future work.
3 Greedy Algorithm in the Contextual Setting
In this section, we consider a k-arm linear contextual bandit problem with a single unknown d-
dimensional parameter vector θ ∈ Rd (e.g., see [12]). In each round t, contexts a1,t, . . . , ak,t are
presented to the learner, each in Rd and associated to one action. The learner then chooses an action
indexed by It ∈ {1, . . . , k} and observes the corrupted reward
Yt = 〈θ, aIt,t〉+ t + ct(aIt,t), (11)
where the same assumptions from Section 1.1 hold for both (t)Tt=1 and ct(·) (with attack budget C),
and ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1. Similar to (2), the cumulative regret is RT =
∑T
t=1 maxi∈{1,...,k}〈θ, ai,t − aIt,t〉.
In general, the introduction of contexts may significantly complicate the problem, with algorithms
such as the one in Section 2 being difficult to extend, particularly with unknown C. However, perhaps
surprisingly, a line of recent works has demonstrated that simple exploration-free greedy methods can
provably work well (in the non-corrupted setting) under mild additional assumptions on the contexts.
These assumptions amount to kinds of context diversity [3, 12, 23] ensuring that the collected samples
are sufficiently informative for learning θ accurately.
Most related to this paper is [12], who analyze the greedy algorithm in the case that arbitrary
context vectors undergo small random perturbations. Motivated by these results, we investigate
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the performance of the greedy algorithm under the same assumption on the contexts, but with the
addition of adversarial attacks. Our main finding is that the context diversity assumption not only
removes the need for explicit exploration [12], but also automatically inherits near-optimal robustness
to adversarial attacks, with no need to know the attack budget C.
Context generation. In more detail, the setup of [12] is introduced as follows: An arbitrary tuple
µ1,t, . . . , µK,t of mean context vectors is given (possibly selected by an adaptive adversary based on
the history of contexts, actions, and rewards), such that ‖µi,t‖2 ≤ 1 for all i, t. For every available
action, the context vector is then generated as ai,t = µi,t + ξi,t, where the random perturbation
vectors ξi,t are drawn independently from some zero-mean distributionsD1,t, . . . , DK,t. We consider
perturbations that are (r, δ)-bounded for some r ≤ 1 according to the following definition [12]:
P[‖ξi,t‖∞ ≤ r for all arms i and rounds t] ≤ 1− δ. (12)
As outlined above, we are interested in the diversity of samples collected by the greedy algorithm
(defined below). The main idea is that the observed contexts should cover all directions in order to
enable good estimation of the latent vector θ. Consequently, we make use of the notion of diversity
from [12], which takes into account that the learner observes rewards for contexts that are selected
greedily and thus only observes a conditional distribution of contexts. Specifically, following [12],
a distribution D is called (r, λ0)-diverse with parameters r > 0 and λ0 > 0 if, for a = µ+ ξ with
ξ ∼ D and any µ ∈ Rd, it holds for all θˆ ∈ Rd and bˆ ∈ R satisfying bˆ ≤ r‖θˆ‖2 that
λmin
(
Eξ∼D
[
aaT
∣∣ θˆT ξ ≥ bˆ]) ≥ λ0. (13)
The overall perturbations are (r, λ0)-diverse if the distributions Di,t are (r, λ0)-diverse for all i and t.
This diversity condition is the main component in [12] for proving that the minimum eigenvalue of the
empirical covariance matrix λmin(
∑t
τ=1 aIτ ,τa
T
Iτ ,τ
) grows linearly with t. In Lemma 6 (Appendix
B), we demonstrate that this is the main quantity that has an impact on the accuracy of the estimator
of θ, and in turn, on the regret bounds in the corrupted setting.
Greedy algorithm. In round t, the greedy algorithm (see Algorithm 2) receives a set of contexts
{a1,t, . . . , ak,t}, and chooses the best action according to the least squares estimate of θ:
It = arg max
i∈{1,...,K}
〈θˆt, ai,t〉 and θˆt = arg min
θ′
t−1∑
τ=1
(〈θ′, aIτ ,τ 〉 − Yτ )2. (14)
Our regret bound for this setup is stated as follows, and proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 5. Suppose that ‖ai,t‖2 ≤ 1 for all i, t, the random context perturbations are (r, 1/T )-
bounded and (r, λ0)-diverse with r ≤ 1, the reward noise is 1-sub-Gaussian, and the attack budget is
C ≥ 0. Then with probability at least 1− δ, the greedy algorithm has regret bounded by
RT = O
(
1
λ0
(√
dT log
(
dT
δ
)
+ C log T + log
(
dT
δ
))
+
√
log(kδ )
)
. (15)
Under the mild assumptions δ = e−O(dT ) and kδ = e
O(dT ), this bound simplifies to
RT = O
(
1
λ0
(√
dT log
(
Td
δ
)
+ C log T
))
. (16)
In addition, when C = 0, Theorem 5 reduces to the result of [12]. The additional 1λ0C log T term
is essentially optimal when λ0 = Θ(1), since a simple argument from [22] gives an Ω(C) lower
bound (see Appendix C). In Corollary 1 (Appendix B), we specialize Theorem 5 to the case that the
perturbations are Gaussian, i.e., every ξi,t is drawn independently from N (0, η2I), and show that the
greedy algorithm has sublinear regret in the low-η regime.
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the algorithms studied in this paper, along with
the baselines LinUCB [18, 16] and Thompson sampling [1].3 We consider both the robust phased
elimination algorithm and the contextual greedy algorithm, starting with the latter.
3We use LinUCB as described in [16, Sec. 19.2] with least-squares regularization parameter λ = 1 and
confidence parameter δ = 0.1, and Thompson sampling [1] uses an i.i.d. Gaussian prior with variance 0.5.
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Figure 1: Contextual synthetic experiment: (Left) Regret at time T = 3500 as a function of C with
η = 0.5; (Middle Two) Regret as a function of time with η = 0 and η = 0.5; (Right) Performance of
Greedy at time T = 3500 with C = 150 and varying η.
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Figure 2: MovieLens experiment: (Left 3) Regret as a function of time with C = 150 for Greedy,
LinUCB, and Thompson sampling; (Right) Regret of all algorithms under the Garcelon et al. attack.
4.1 Choices of Attacks
We consider the following attack algorithms, each depending on a target arm atarget and/or a target
parameter vector θtarget. These are briefly outlined as follows, with more details in Appendix D:
• Garcelon et al. attack. This attack is a minor modification of that of [8], leaving pulls from
atarget uncorrupted, while pushing all other rewards down to the minimum value.
• Oracle MAB attack. This attack from [11] pushes the reward of any a 6= atarget to some
margin 0 below that of atarget, or leaves the reward unchanged if such a margin is already met.
• Simple θ-based attack. This attack acts in the same way as that of Garcelon et al., but
with atarget always chosen as arg maxa〈a, θtarget〉. This is equivalent to that of [8] in the
non-contextual setting, but otherwise may differ due to atarget varying with time.
• Flip-θ attack. This attack simply flips the reward from 〈θ, a〉 to 〈−θ, a〉.
Note that the terminology “oracle” refers to attacks that use knowledge of θ, which we assume to
be permitted in this paper (the Flip-θ attack also falls in this category). We set atarget to be the first
arm, which will have the same effect as choosing any fixed arm (since our arm feature vectors will be
generated in a symmetric manner). In addition, we let θtarget be uniform on the unit sphere in the
simple θ-based attack, and set 0 = 0.01 in the Oracle MAB attack.
4.2 Contextual Setting
Synthetic Experiment. In this experiment, we consider the contextual setting with contexts having
uniform entries and Gaussian perturbations with variance η2 > 0; see Appendix E for the full details.
We consider k = 25 arms, T = 5000 rounds, and attack budget C = 50. At each time instant, we
plot the cumulative regret averaged over 10 trials, and error bars indicate one standard deviation. In
Appendix E, we also provide analogous plots and discussion for the case that C = 150.
In Figure 1 (Left), we plot the regret of Greedy at T = 3500 as a function of C with η = 0.5. We
observe a linear increase, which is in agreement with our theory. Analogous plots for LinUCB,
Thompson sampling, and η ∈ {0.2, 0.5} can be found in Appendix E. The middle two plots in
Figure 1 show the regret as a function of time with the two most effective attacks, with η = 0 and
η = 0.5. We see that the regret curves are still increasing linearly under the Flip-θ attack by time
T = 5000 when η = 0, whereas they are nearly flat when η = 0.5. While our theory only supports
the robustness of Greedy, these experiments suggest that LinUCB and Thompson sampling may also
enjoy similar robustness under context diversity. Finally, Figure 1 (Right) plots the regret of Greedy
at T = 3500 as a function of η when C = 150. We observe that once η moves past a certain level, the
performance remains fairly consistent, with a general (but not definitive) trend of decreasing regret.
The greatest difference is at η = 0, particularly when the standard deviation is considered.
MovieLens Experiment. We use the MovieLens-100K dataset in a similar manner to [5]; see
Appendix E for details. In each trial of the experiment, we select a uniformly random user and treat
the 1682 movies as possible contexts. At each time instant, k = 30 of these movies are chosen
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Figure 3: Non-contextual synthetic experiment with 10 trials: (Left) Average regret as a function of
time; (Middle) Worst run among 10; (Right) Second-worst run among 10.
uniformly at random and presented as the context vectors. Hence, a subset of the movie vectors form
the contexts, and a fixed user vector forms θ. We set T = 20000 and C = 100, and we plot the regret
averaged over 10 trials (each corresponding to a different user).
In Figure 2, we plot the regret as a function of time, for Greedy, LinUCB, and Thompson sampling.
Despite the lack of explicit context perturbation in this experiment, we see that the algorithms are
again able to recover from the attacks, suggesting that the various movies in the data set are sufficiently
diverse. On the other hand, we do not claim the attacks here to be optimal, and it is possible that
stronger attacks may incur linear regret. In Figure 2 (Right), we plot all three algorithms under the
strongest attack and under no attack. We see that Greedy has very low regret when there is no attack,
but has slightly higher regret when attacked.
4.3 Non-Contextual Setting
We now turn to experiments for the robust PE algorithm (Algorithm 1), with some minor practical
changes detailed in Appendix E. We use the above synthetic experimental setup with the context
perturbations removed (i.e., η = 0), and with d = 5, k = 50, T = 40000, and C = 150. For
comparison, we also include non-robust PE, which removes the second term in (7).
For LinUCB, Thompson sampling, and non-robust PE, we continue to attack right from the start.
However, for robust PE, this is a poor attack strategy, since the algorithm initially uses a very stringent
condition for elimination. Instead, following insight from the proof of Theorem 2, we start the attack
at the first epoch for which Cˆh < C. We consider the Flip-θ attack of Section 4.1, as well as an
additional Top-N attack targeted at eliminating good arms: Whenever any of the top N remaining
arms are pulled, push the reward to −1. We consider both N = 3 and N = 5. We focus on the case
of unknown C here, and present similar plots for known C in Appendix E.
In Figure 3 (Left), we see that the average regret of all algorithms is similar by the end of the time
horizon; however, an inspection of the error bars reveals that this is not the full story. In particular,
the regret of LinUCB and Thompson sampling vary considerably depending on whether the attack
was successful or not, whereas robust PE exhibits much lower variation. To highlight this, we plot the
regret from the worst and second-worst runs out of 10 (as measured at time T ) in Figure 3 (Middle)
and Figure 3 (Right). In Appendix E, we provide analogous plots in the case of 40 trials, showing the
worst 4-out-of-40 runs and observing similar behavior to Figure 3.
We see that LinUCB and Thompson sampling visibly have linear regret, whereas the regret of robust
PE flattens out by the end of the time horizon even for these worst-2-of-10 curves, indicating better
high-probability behavior. On the other hand, these experiments suggest the possibility of algorithms
with improved finite-time performance guarantees, which was not the focus of this paper.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the linear stochastic problem in the presence of adversarial attacks/corruptions.
We provided novel algorithms in both the standard and contextual settings that are provably robust
against such attacks. We demonstrated near-optimal regret bounds in all cases, and to our knowledge,
we are the first to do so in each case. A possible direction for future work is to consider a setting in
which both rewards and contexts can be altered by the adversary subject to a limited attack budget.
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Broader Impact
Who may benefit from this research. This is a theory-oriented paper targeted at the research
community. The bandit algorithms studied could potentially be useful for practitioners in areas where
data can be altered by malicious adversaries, such as online advertising and recommender systems.
Who may be put at disadvantage from this research. We are not aware of any significant or
specific risks of placing anyone at a disadvantage.
Consequences of failure of the system. Since our algorithms are designed under an abstract
mathematical framework, it is difficult to anticipate the consequences of failure in practice. We
note that the algorithms are only shown to be robust to a particular type of adversarial attack on the
rewards, and thus, could still be non-robust to other attacks (e.g., attacks on the context vectors).
Potential biases. Various notions of fairness have been studied in the multi-armed bandit literature,
and the algorithms studied in this paper do not attempt to address this issue. Thus, they may be
subject to the same fairness limitations as standard bandit algorithms.
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Supplementary Material
Stochastic Linear Bandits Robust to Adversarial Attacks
Ilija Bogunovic, Arpan Losalka, Andreas Krause, Jonathan Scarlett
A Proofs for Section 2 (Robust Phased Elimination Algorithm)
A.1 Single Epoch Analysis (Known Corruption Budget)
In this section, we consider a single fixed epoch indexed by h. Since the analysis here holds for any
epoch, we omit the subscript (·)h throughout; in particular, θˆ = θˆh and Γ = Γh are as given in (6),
A = Ah is the active set of arms, u(a) = uh(a) is the number of times a is played, and u = uh is
the total length of the epoch.
Lemma 1. For any action b ∈ A, the following holds with probability at least 1− 2δ:
|〈b, θˆ − θ〉| ≤ ‖b‖Γ−1
√
2 log(1δ ) +
C
mν
√∑
a∈A
u(a)‖b‖Γ−1 . (17)
Proof. We recall the definition of the set T (a) = {s ∈ {1, . . . , u} : As = a}, whose cardinality is
given by u(a). We characterize the considered estimator of θ as follows:
θˆ = Γ−1
u∑
t=1
Atu(At)
−1 ∑
s∈T (At)
Ys (18)
= Γ−1
u∑
t=1
Atu(At)
−1
( ∑
s∈T (At)
(〈θ,As〉+ s + cs(As))) (19)
=
(
Γ−1
u∑
t=1
AtA
T
t θ
)
+
(
Γ−1
u∑
t=1
Atu(At)
−1 ∑
s∈T (At)
s
)
+
(
Γ−1
u∑
t=1
Atu(At)
−1 ∑
s∈T (At)
cs(As)
)
(20)
= θ +
(
Γ−1
u∑
t=1
Att
)
+
(
Γ−1
u∑
t=1
Atu(At)
−1 ∑
s∈T (At)
cs(As)
)
, (21)
where (19) uses the decomposition of Ys into the reward/noise/corruption, (20) uses u(a) = |T (a)|
and the fact that all s ∈ T (At) have As = At, and (21) uses Γ =
∑
a∈A u(a)aa
T =
∑u
t=1AtA
T
t .
By (21), for any action b ∈ A (or more generally b ∈ A0), we have
∣∣〈b, θˆ − θ〉∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣bTΓ−1
u∑
t=1
Att
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣bTΓ−1
u∑
t=1
Atu(At)
−1 ∑
s∈T (At)
cs(As)
∣∣∣∣∣. (22)
We proceed by bounding the two terms separately. The second term can be rewritten as follows:∣∣∣∣∣bTΓ−1
u∑
t=1
Atu(At)
−1 ∑
s∈T (a)
cs(As)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A,u(a) 6=0
Ca
u(a)
u(a)bTΓ−1a
∣∣∣∣∣, (23)
where we use Ca to denote
∑
s∈T (a) cs(a), i.e., the sum of corruptions for arm a in the epoch, and
we keep the factor u(a)u(a) for convenience in what follows.
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Next, we have∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A,u(a) 6=0
Ca
u(a)
u(a)bTΓ−1a
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
a∈A,u(a)6=0
C
u(a)
u(a)
∣∣∣bTΓ−1a∣∣∣ (24)
≤ C
mν
∑
a∈A
u(a)
∣∣∣bTΓ−1a∣∣∣ (25)
≤ C
mν
√(∑
a∈A
u(a)
)
bT
∑
a∈A
u(a)Γ−1aaTΓ−1b (26)
=
C
mν
√∑
a∈A
u(a)‖b‖Γ−1 , (27)
where (24) uses the triangle inequality and |Ca| ≤ C for every a, (25) holds since u(a) ≥ νm by
the choice of u(a), (26) follows by multiplying and dividing by
∑
a¯∈A u(a¯) and applying E[|Z|] ≤√
E[Z2] with the distribution u(a)∑
a¯∈A u(a¯)
, and (27) follows by taking the first Γ−1 term outside the
sum and applying the definition of Γ = Γh from (6).
Since (t)ut=1 are independent and 1-sub-Gaussian, the first term in (22) is bounded via standard
concentration results: From [16, Eq. (20.2)], with probability at least 1− 2δ, we have∣∣∣bTΓ−1 u∑
t=1
Att
∣∣∣ ≤ ‖b‖Γ−1√2 log(1δ ). (28)
Combining the bounds obtained in (27) and (28) completes the proof.
Next, we characterize the term ‖b‖2Γ−1 =
√
bTΓ−1b appearing in (17).
Lemma 2. For any arm b ∈ A, it holds that
‖b‖2Γ−1 ≤
2d
m
. (29)
Proof. We have
‖b‖2Γ−1 = bTΓ−1b (30)
= bT
(∑
a∈A
u(a)aaT
)−1
b (31)
= bT
(∑
a∈A
dmmax{ζ(a), ν}eaaT
)−1
b (32)
≤ bT
(∑
a∈A
mζ(a)aaT
)−1
b (33)
≤ 2d
m
, (34)
where:
• (31) and (32) follow from the definitions of Γ = Γh and u(a) = uh(a) in Algorithm 1;
• (33) follows by letting A = ∑a∈Amζ(a)aaT and B = ∑a∈Admmax{ζ(a), ν}eaaT and
noting that ‖b‖2A−1 ≥ ‖b‖2B−1 whenever A−1  B−1, or equivalently B  A (i.e., inversion
reverses Loewner orders).;
• (34) follows from maxa∈Ah ‖a‖2Γ(ζh)−1 ≤ 2d (second step in Algorithm 1) and the definition
Γ(ζ) =
∑
a∈A ζ(a)aa
T .
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Combining the results obtained in Lemmas 1 and 2, we find that with probability at least 1− 2δ, the
following holds for any b ∈ A:
|〈b, θˆ − θ〉| ≤
√
4d
m
log
(1
δ
)
+
C
mν
√
2du
m
. (35)
In the following lemma, we bound the total epoch length u = uh in terms of the quantity m = mh
from Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3. Let m0 = 4d(log log d+ 18), and let ν ∈ (0, 1) be the truncation parameter. Then, the
epoch length in Algorithm 1 is bounded as u ≤ 2m(1 +m0ν).
Proof. We have
u =
∑
a∈A,ζ(a)6=0
dmmax{ζ(a), ν}e (36)
≤
∑
a∈A,ζ(a)6=0
(
mmax{ζ(a), ν}+ 1) (37)
≤ 4d(log log d+ 18) +
∑
a∈A,ζ(a)6=0
mmax{ζ(a), ν} (38)
≤ m+
∑
a∈A,ζ(a)6=0
mmax{ζ(a), ν} (39)
≤ 2m
∑
a∈A,ζ(a)6=0
max{ζ(a), ν} (40)
≤ 2m(1 +m0ν), (41)
where (38) uses the support bound in (5), (39) uses m0 = 4d(log log d + 18) and m0 ≤ m, (40)
follows since
∑
a∈A,ζ(a) 6=0 max{ζ(a), ν} ≥
∑
a ζ(a) = 1 for any ν ∈ (0, 1), and (41) uses
max{α, β} ≤ α+ β for α, β ≥ 0.
We are now in position to state the main lemma of this section, which follows by combining Lemma 3
with (35), and provides corruption-tolerant confidence bounds.
Lemma 4. In the given (arbitrary) epoch under consideration, with probability at least 1− 2δ, we
have for any a ∈ A that
|〈a, θˆ − θ〉| ≤
√
4d
m
log
(1
δ
)
+
C
mν
√
4d(1 + νm0). (42)
In addition, the same holds simultaneously for all a ∈ A with probability at least 1− 2kδ.
Note that we renamed b to a, and the second part follows by a union bound over the k arms.
A.2 Regret Analysis (Known Corruption Budget)
We start by showing that with high probability, Algorithm 1 never eliminates the optimal arm.
Recalling that the optimal arm is a∗ = arg maxa∈A0〈θ, a〉, we trivially have a∗ ∈ A0. We first show
that a∗ ∈ A1 with high probability.
At the end of epoch 0, the estimate θˆ0 is formed. Letting aˆ = arg maxa∈A0〈θˆ0, a〉 and conditioning
on the second part of Lemma 4 holding true, we have
〈θˆ0, aˆ− a∗〉 ≤ 〈θˆ, aˆ〉 − 〈θ, aˆ〉+ 〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θˆ, a∗〉. (43)
= 〈θˆ − θ, aˆ〉+ 〈θ − θˆ, a∗〉 (44)
≤ 2
√
4d
m0
log
(1
δ
)
+
2C
m0ν
√
4d(1 + νm0), (45)
where (43) holds since a∗ maximizes 〈θ, a〉, while (45) is due to (42).
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Notice that (45) is precisely the condition used in the algorithm to retain arms. It follows that the
algorithm will not eliminate the optimal arm at the end of the first epoch, with probability at least
1− 2kδ. By applying an induction argument with the same steps as above in subsequent epochs, it
follows that if H˜ is any almost-sure upper bound on the number of epochs H , then with probability
at least 1− 2kH˜δ, the algorithm will retain the optimal arm in every epoch. We claim that we can
set H˜ = log2(T ). To see this, note that mh = 2
hm0, and because each epoch’s length uh ≥ mh is
hence greater than 2h, the total number of epochs H is deterministically upper bounded by log2 T .
In the remainder of the proof, we condition on the preceding events that hold with probability at least
1− 2kH˜δ (we will later rescale δ by 2kH˜ for consistency with the statement of Theorem 1). Hence,
the optimal arm is retained, and the confidence bounds (42) apply in all epochs.
We proceed by analyzing the regret. Fix h ∈ {0, . . . ,H − 1}, and let uh(a) denote the number of
times arm a is played in epoch h. From the definition of regret, we have
RT =
T∑
t=1
(〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ,At〉) (46)
=
H−1∑
h=0
∑
a∈Ah
uh(a)
(〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ, a〉) (47)
≤ 2u0 +
H−1∑
h=1
∑
a∈Ah
uh(a)
(〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ, a〉) (48)
≤ 2u0 +
H−1∑
h=1
∑
a∈Ah
uh(a)
(
4
√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 4Cmh−1ν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
)
(49)
= 2u0 +
H−1∑
h=1
uh
(
4
√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 4Cmh−1ν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
)
(50)
≤ 2u0 +
H−1∑
h=1
2mh(1 + νm0)
(
4
√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 4Cmh−1ν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
)
(51)
= 2u0 +
H−1∑
h=1
4mh
(
4
√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 4Cm0mh−1
√
8d
)
(52)
= 2u0 +
H−1∑
h=1
(
64
√
dmh−1 log
(
1
δ
)
+ 64Cm0
√
2d
)
(53)
≤ 2u0 + 64c0
√
dT log
(
1
δ
)
+ 64Cm0
√
2d log2 T, (54)
where:
• (47) uses the definition of uh(a);
• (48) uses the fact that the instant regret is at most 2 and the length of the first epoch is u0;
• (49) follows since
〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ, a〉 ≤ 〈θˆh−1, a∗〉 − 〈θˆh−1, a〉+ 2
(√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)
+ Cmh−1ν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
)
(55)
≤ 4
(√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)
+ Cmh−1ν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
)
, (56)
where (55) follows by using (42) to upper and lower bound 〈θ, a∗〉 and 〈θ, a〉 respectively, and
(56) follows from the condition (7) for retaining arms (with Cˆh = C);
• (51) follows from Lemma 3;
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• (52) follows by choosing ν = 1m0 as per Theorem 1;4
• (53) follows by applying mh = 2mh−1 and simplifying;
• (54) holds for some constant c0 > 0 since a sum of exponentially increasing terms is upper
bounded by a constant times the last (and the longest epoch length is trivially at most T ), and
we also use H ≤ H˜ = log2(T ) for the second term.
We note that the first term in (54) is insignificant compared to the last term, since u0 ≤ 4m0 by
Lemma 3 with ν = 1m0 . Since the preceding analysis holds with probability at least 1− 2kH˜δ, we
scale δ ← δ
2kH˜
to obtain that with probability at least 1− δ that
RT = O˜
(√
dT log
(
k
δ
)
+ Cd3/2 log T
)
, (57)
where the O(log H˜) = O(log log T ) term and the O(log log d) term from m0 are absorbed into the
O˜(·) notation.
A.3 Unknown Corruption Budget
Recall that for unknown C, the algorithm uses Cˆh = min{
√
T
m0 log2 T
,m0
√
d2H˜−h}, where H˜ =
log2 T is a deterministic upper bound on the number H of epochs. Recall also that we assume
C <
√
T
m0 log2 T
, with the case C ≥
√
T
m0 log2 T
discussed following Theorem 2.
A few observations are in order before we proceed:
• We refer to epochs for which Cˆh ≥ C as safe, as the adversary cannot eliminate the optimal
arm in these epochs. This follows from the analysis of Section A.2, where we showed that if
the true C is used in the criterion for retaining arms, then the optimal arm is retained with high
probability (thus, the same follows if Cˆh ≥ C is used instead).
• Let h′ be the first epoch index for which C ≥ Cˆh. It follows that
C ≥ 2H˜−h′m0
√
d, and hence log2
(
C
m0
√
d
) ≥ H˜ − h′. (58)
Thus, the number of remaining epochs H − h′ is at most log2
(
C
m0
√
d
)
.
• In the worst case, the adversary can distribute its budget C among these later epochs with
indices h ≥ h′ to force arms to be eliminated. That is, with Ch denoting the budget used in
epoch h (so that
∑H−1
h=0 Ch = C), it is possible to have Ch > Cˆh in these epochs. We therefore
refer to these epochs as unsafe. Note that since C <
√
T
m0 log2 T
, the adversary does not have
enough budget to make any "early" epoch for which min{m0
√
d2H˜−h,
√
T
m0 log2 T
} =
√
T
m0 log2 T
to be unsafe.
We consider the first unsafe epoch h′, and suppose that the adversary eliminates the optimal arm.
Hence, it holds that Ch′ > Cˆh′ . Our goal will be to show that although the optimal arm gets
eliminated, an arm ah′ that is "almost" as good as the optimal arm is retained.
Because a∗ got eliminated, the rule (7) for retaining arms implies:
max
a∈Ah′
〈θˆh′ , a− a∗〉 > 2
√
4d
mh′
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 2Cˆh′mh′ν
√
4d(1 + νm0). (59)
Let ah′ = arg maxa∈Ah′ 〈θˆh′ , a− a∗〉, and observe that ah′ is not eliminated, i.e., ah′ ∈ Ah′+1.
We again condition on the second part of Lemma 4, which holds with probability at least 1− 2kH˜δ.
This event implies for every a ∈ Ah′ that
|〈a, θˆh′ − θ〉| ≤
√
4d
mh′
log( 1δ ) +
C
mh′ν
√
4d(1 + νm0), (60)
4The final term in (51) contains both increasing and decreasing factors with respect to ν, thus not permitting
us to set ν to an arbitrary small value. The choice ν = 1
m0
is convenient for the analysis, though we do not
claim it to be optimal, nor necessarily the best in practice.
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and note that this holds for both ah′ and a∗, since both ah′ , a∗ ∈ Ah′ (recall that the adversary does
not have enough budget to remove a∗ from Ah′ according to the definition of h′). Combining the
two associated bounds, we obtain
〈θˆh′ , ah′ − a∗〉 ≤ 〈θ, ah′ − a∗〉+ 2
√
4d
mh′
log( 1δ ) +
2C
mh′ν
√
4d(1 + νm0), (61)
and combining (59) with (61) gives
〈θ, ah′〉 > 〈θ, a∗〉 − 2mh′ν
√
4d(1 + νm0)(C − Cˆh′) (62)
≥ 〈θ, a∗〉 − 2Cmh′ν
√
4d(1 + νm0). (63)
By denoting ηh′ := 〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ, ah′〉, we can rewrite (63) as
ηh′ <
2C
mh′ν
√
4d(1 + νm0). (64)
Note that ηh′ represents the additional regret (due to the optimal arm elimination) that our algorithm
can incur in epoch h′ + 1 for each arm pull.
In epoch h′ + 1, the optimal arm a∗ is already eliminated in the worst case, and again, the adversary
can potentially eliminate the best remaining arm a∗h′+1 = arg maxa∈Ah′+1〈θ, a〉 by using Ch′+1 >
Cˆh′+1. By repeating the same arguments as those leading to (64), the additional regret can be written
as ηh′+1 = 〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ, ah′+1〉, where ah′+1 = arg maxa∈Ah′+1〈θˆh′+1, a − a∗h′+1〉, and it holds
that
ηh′+1 < ηh′ +
2C
νmh′+1
√
4d(1 + νm0) (65)
< s 2Cν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
(
1
mh′
+ 1mh′+1
)
. (66)
By induction, for each of the remaining epochs, we have:
ηh′+l <
2C
ν
√
4d(1 + νm0)
h′+l∑
i=h′
1
mi
(67)
≤ 2c0Cmh′ν
√
4d(1 + νm0), (68)
where (68) holds for some constant c0, since the sum of exponentially shrinking terms is dominated
by the first one in the sum. Next, by substituting ν = 1m0 and using uh ≤ 4mh, we deduce that the
total additional regret that we incur is:
H−2∑
h=h′
uh+1ηh ≤
H−2∑
h=h′
4mh+1ηh (69)
≤ 8c0m0Cmh′
√
8d
H−2∑
h=h′
mh+1 (70)
≤ 8c′1m0C
√
8dmH−2mh′
(71)
= O
(
C2
)
, (72)
where (70) applies (68) with ν = 1m0 , (71) holds for some constant c
′
1 (depending on c0) since a sum
of exponentially increasing terms is upper bounded by a constant times the last term, and (72) uses
mH−2
mh′
= 2
H−2m0
2h′m0
= 2H−h
′−2 ≤ 2H˜−h′ ≤ 2log2
(
C
m0
√
d
)
=
C
m0
√
d
, (73)
with the first inequality using (58).
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We now proceed to bound the regret similarly to (46):
RT =
T∑
t=1
(〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ,At〉) (74)
=
H−1∑
h=0
∑
a∈Ah
uh(a)
(〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ, a〉) (75)
≤ 2u0 +
H−1∑
h=1
∑
a∈Ah
uh(a)
(〈θ, a∗〉 − 〈θ, a〉) (76)
≤ 2u0 +
(H−1∑
h=1
4mh
(
4
√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 2Cˆh−1m0mh−1
√
8d+ 2Cm0mh−1
√
8d
))
+
H−2∑
h=h′
uh+1ηh,
(77)
where the Cˆh−1 term comes from the condition (7) for retaining arms, and the C term comes from
the use of (42) (this is in contrast to the known C case, in which the former term also uses C).
It remains to bound the terms in (77) separately. We have already shown the bound on the last term
(see in (72)). Next, we show:
H−1∑
h=1
4mh
2Cˆh−1m0
mh−1
√
8d = 16m0
√
8d
H−1∑
h=1
Cˆh−1 (78)
= 16m0
√
8d
H∑
h=1
min{
√
T
m0 log2 T
,m0
√
d2H˜−h} (79)
≤ 16m0
√
8dT
m0
(80)
= O(
√
dT ), (81)
where (78) usesmh = 2mh−1, (79) substitutes the choice of Cˆh, and (80) upper bounds the minimum
by the first term and applies H ≤ H˜ = log2 T .
Similarly, recalling that m0 = d log log d+ 16, we have
H−1∑
h=1
4mh
2Cm0
mh−1
√
8d = 16m0
√
8dC log T (82)
= O˜(d3/2C log T ), (83)
and
H−1∑
h=1
4mh
(
4
√
4d
mh−1
log
(
1
δ
)) ≤ 64c0√dT log ( 1δ ) (84)
= O
(√
dT log
(
1
δ
))
, (85)
where (84) holds for some constant c0 > 0 similarly to (54). Then, again replacing δ ← δ2kH˜ in the
same way as the known C case, the term (85) becomes
O˜
(√
dT log
(
k
δ
))
, (86)
and the associated probability is now 1− δ.
Combining (72), (81), (83) and (86), we arrive at the regret bound:
RT = O˜
(√
dT log
(
k
δ
)
+ d3/2C log T + C2
)
. (87)
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Algorithm 2 Contextual Greedy
Require: Initialize θˆ1 arbitrarily
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
2: Receive a set of contexts {a1,t, . . . , ak,t}
3: Choose arm It = arg maxi∈{1,...,K}〈θˆt, ai,t〉
4: Observe: Yt = 〈θ, aIt,t〉+ t + ct(aIt,t)
5: Update θˆt+1 ∈ arg minθ′
∑t
τ=1(〈θ′, aIτ ,τ 〉 − Yτ )2 . break ties arbitrarily
6: end for
B Proofs for Section 3 (Contextual Greedy Algorithm)
For reference, a complete description of the greedy algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Before proving Theorem 5, we introduce some useful auxiliary results. Our proof builds heavily
on that of [12], whose setup matches ours but does not consider adversarial attacks (i.e., their setup
corresponds to the case that C = 0).
Lemma 5 (Lemma 3.1 [12]). If ‖ai,t‖2 ≤ 1 for all i, t, then for any t0 < T , we have
RT ≤ 2t0 + 2
T∑
t=t0
‖θ − θˆt‖2. (88)
Proof. We reproduce the proof for the sake of demonstrating the use of the greedy rule in (14). Recall
that the least-squares estimator θˆt is computed by using the previously observed attacked rewards.
We can bound the regret incurred in the first t0 rounds by the maximum regret value 2. Then, we
consider the regret rt incurred at time t; denoting i∗t = arg maxi∈{1,...,K}〈θ, ai,t〉, we have
rt = 〈θ, ai∗t ,t〉 − 〈θ, aIt,t〉 (89)
=
(〈θ, ai∗t ,t〉 − 〈θˆt, ai∗t ,t〉)− (〈θ, aIt,t〉 − 〈θˆt, aIt,t〉)+ (〈θˆt, ai∗t ,t〉 − 〈θˆt, aIt,t〉) (90)
≤ (〈θ, ai∗t ,t〉 − 〈θˆt, ai∗t ,t〉)− (〈θ, aIt,t〉 − 〈θˆt, aIt,t〉) (91)
≤ ∣∣〈θ, ai∗t ,t〉 − 〈θˆt, ai∗t ,t〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈θ, aIt,t〉 − 〈θˆt, aIt,t〉∣∣ (92)
≤ ‖θ − θˆt‖2‖ai∗t ,t‖2 + ‖θ − θˆt‖2‖aIt,t‖2 (93)
≤ 2‖θ − θˆt‖2, (94)
where (91) follows since It is selected greedily, and hence 〈θˆt, ai∗t ,t〉 − 〈θˆt, aIt,t〉 ≤ 0.
Lemma 6. For each round t, let Γt =
∑
τ≤t aIτa
T
Iτ
, and suppose that all contexts satisfy ‖ai,t‖2 ≤ 1,
the reward noise is 1-sub-Gaussian, and the attack budget is C ≥ 0. If λmin(Γt) > 0, then with
probability at least 1− δ, it holds that
‖θ − θˆt‖2 ≤
√
2dt log(td/δ)
λmin(Γt)
+
C
λmin(Γt)
. (95)
Proof. Since λmin(Γt) > 0, the matrix Γt is invertible, and we can use the standard closed-form
least squares solution expression: θˆt = Γ−1t
∑
τ≤t aIτ ,τYτ . Decomposing Yτ into the sum of the
reward, noise, and adversarial corruption (similarly to (21)), we obtain
θˆt = θ + Γ
−1
t
∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ τ + Γ
−1
t
∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ cτ (aIτ ,τ ), (96)
which implies that
‖θˆt − θ‖2 ≤
∥∥Γ−1t ∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ τ
∥∥
2
+
∥∥Γ−1t ∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ cτ (aIτ ,τ )
∥∥
2
(97)
≤ 1
λmin(Γt)
(∥∥∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ τ
∥∥
2
+
∥∥∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ cτ (aIτ ,τ )
∥∥
2
)
. (98)
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With probability at least 1− δ, the first term is bounded as [12, Lemma A.1]∥∥∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ τ
∥∥
2
≤
√
2dt log(td/δ). (99)
For the second term in (98), we note the following:∥∥∑
τ≤t
aIτ ,τ cτ (aIτ ,τ )
∥∥
2
≤
∑
τ≤t
∥∥aIτ ,τ cτ (aIτ ,τ )∥∥2 (100)
≤
∑
τ≤t
|cτ (aIτ ,τ )| ·
∥∥aIτ ,τ∥∥2 (101)
≤
∑
τ≤t
|cτ (aIτ ,τ )| (102)
≤ C. (103)
Combining (98) with (99) and (103) completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5. We follow the steps of the proof of [12, Thm. 3.1]. We start by
proving the following counterpart of [12, Corollary 3.1]: Letting t0 = max
{
4 +
2
√
1
2 log
(
k
δ
)
, 32 log( 4Tδ ),
80 log(2dT/δ)
λ0
}
, for every t ≥ t0, it holds with probability at least 1 − δ
that
‖θ − θˆt‖2 ≤ 32
√
d log(2Td/δ)
λ0
√
t
+
16C
λ0t
. (104)
To prove this, we use Lemma 6 with δ2 in place of δ; (104) will then follow once we show that
λmin(Γt) ≥ tλ0
16
. (105)
This result is shown in [12, Lemma B.1] (making use of the assumption t ≥ t0), and only requires
that the random context perturbations are (r, λ0)-diverse. Thus, it continues to hold in the corrupted
setting with C > 0.
Combining (88) and (104), we have with probability at least 1− δ that
RT ≤ 2t0 + 2
T∑
t=t0
(
32
√
d log 2Tdδ
λ0
√
t
+ 16Cλ0t
)
(106)
≤ 2t0 +
128
√
dT log
(
2Td
δ
)
λ0
+ 64C log Tλ0 , (107)
since
∑T
t=1
1√
t
≤ 2√T and ∑Tt=1 1t ≤ 2 log T (with the latter assuming T > 2). Substituting the
definition of t0, it follows that with probability at least 1− δ, we have
RT = O
(
1
λ0
(√
dT log
(
Td
δ
)
+ C log T + log
(
dT
δ
))
+
√
log(kδ )
)
. (108)
We now consider the special case of Gaussian perturbations, i.e., each ξi,t is drawn independently
from N (0, η2I) for some η > 0. We make use of the above results, as well as the ones from [12,
Section 3.2], to show that Algorithm 2 has sublinear regret under small perturbations. This is formally
stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume the context perturbations ξi,t are drawn independently from N (0, η2I) for all
i, t, the reward noise is 1-sub-Gaussian, and the attack budget of the adversary is C ≥ 0. Then for a
fixed number of arms k and η ≤ O((√d log(Tkd/δ))−1), with probability at least 1− δ, the greedy
algorithm (Algorithm 2) has regret bounded by
RT = O
(√
Td
η2 log
(
dT
δ
)3/2
+ C(log T )
2
η2
)
. (109)
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Proof. The proof strategy is to invoke Theorem 5, and in particular, since k is assumed to be fixed,
its variant stated in (16).
In Theorem 5, it is assumed that ‖ai,t‖2 ≤ 1. However, the right-hand side of one here was only
chosen for convenience, and (as noted in [12]), the same result holds when ‖ai,t‖2 ≤ R′ for any
given R′ ≥ 1 satisfying R′ = O(1). This change only affects the constants, in particular introducing
an (R′)3/2 term [12]; this still behaves as O(1) since we focus on the case that R′ = O(1).
To invoke such a variant of Theorem 5, we need to condition on an event that ensures ‖ai,t‖2 ≤ R′
for some constant R′ > 0 for every i, t and the context perturbations need to be (r, 1/T )–bounded
and (r, λ0)–diverse for some λ0 > 0 and r ≤ R′. Next, we show these conditions hold for the case
of Gaussian context perturbations.
Towards that end, we start by outlining some results from [12]. First [12, Lemma 3.5] states that
when Rˆ ≥ η√2 log(2kdT/δ), we have that:
P
[|ξi,t[j]| ≤ Rˆ, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, t ≤ T, j ∈ {1, . . . , d}] ≥ 1− δ/2. (110)
In what follows, we set Rˆ = 2η
√
2 log(2kdT/δ), and we condition on the event in (111) holding
true. Then, [12, Lemma 3.6] states that when ‖µi,t‖2 ≤ 1, we have
‖ai,t‖2 ≤ 1 +
√
dRˆ := R′ for all i, t, (111)
and the perturbations are (r, 1/T )− bounded for r ≥ η√2 log T .
The perturbation distribution conditioned on the event in (110) holding true is a truncated Gaussian
supported on [−Rˆ, Rˆ], and satisfies (r, λ0)-diversity when [12]
λ0 = Ω
(η4
r2
)
= Ω
( η2
log T
)
. (112)
Finally, from the definitions of R′ in (111) and Rˆ = 2η
√
2 log(2kdT/δ), we have
R′ = 1 +
√
dRˆ ≤ 2 max{1,
√
dRˆ} = 2 max{1, 2η
√
2d log(dkT/δ)}, (113)
and we see that to have R′ = O(1), it suffices to have η ≤ O((√d log(Tkd/δ))−1).
Finally, we apply the above mentioned variant of Theorem 5 with parameter R′ = O(1). By the
union bound, the events in Theorem 5 and event (111) simultaneously hold with probability at least
1− δ. By substituting the bound on λ0 from (112) into (16), we arrive at
RT = O
(√
Td
η2 log
(
dT
δ
)3/2
+ C(log T )
2
η2
)
. (114)
C Proofs of Lower Bounds
We prove Theorems 3 and 4 in Sections C.3 and C.1 respectively. In Sections C.2 and C.4, we prove
two Ω(C) lower bounds using standard arguments, e.g., see [22].
C.1 Lower Bound for d = k = 2 (Unknown C)
Here we show that for d = 2 dimensions and k = 2 arms, for any algorithm that guarantees
RT ≤ R¯(0)T (say, with probability 1− δ) for some uncorrupted regret bound R¯(0)T ≤ T16 when C = 0,
there exists an instance in which RT = Ω(T ) (again with probability 1− δ) when the attack budget
is C = 2R¯(0)T . We show that this is true even with no noise, i.e., t = 0 for all t.
To prove this, consider an instance with feature vectors a1 =
[
1
2 , 0
]T
and a2 =
[
0, 14
]T
, and
parameter vector θ =
[
1
2 ,
1
2
]T
. In this case, pulling a1 incurs zero regret, and pulling a2 incurs regret
1
8 . Hence, by the assumption RT ≤ R¯(0)T , we see that a2 is pulled at most 8R¯(0)T times when C = 0.
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Now consider a different instance, with feature vectors a1 =
[
1
2 , 0
]T
and a2 =
[
0, 34
]T
, and again
θ =
[
1
2 ,
1
2
]T
. In this case, a2 incurs zero regret, and a1 incurs regret 18 . Suppose that C = 2R¯
(0)
T ,
and consider an adversary that pushes the reward of a2 from 38 down to
1
8 whenever it is pulled, at a
cost of ct(At) = 14 . Since C = 2R¯
(0)
T , the adversary can afford to do this 8R¯
(0)
T times.
However, as long as the adversary is corrupting, the observed rewards are exactly the same as in the
first instance above, in which we established that a2 is pulled at most 8R¯
(0)
T times. Since we assume
that R¯(0)T ≤ T16 , it follows that a1 is pulled at least T − 8R¯(0)T ≥ T2 times, leading to Ω(T ) regret.
C.2 Lower Bound for d = 1 and k = 2 (Known C)
In the case that C is known, we can obtain an Ω(C) lower bound using a simple argument from
[22, Sec. 5], which we reproduce here for completeness. Consider an instance with feature scalars
a1 = 1 and a2 = −1. Clearly, arm 1 is better when θ = 1, but arm 2 is better when θ = −1, and
in both cases, the worse arm incurs regret 2. Consider the case that there is no random noise, and
suppose that the adversary shifts every reward to zero until its budget is depleted, i.e., for bCc rounds.
During these rounds, the learner must pull some arm at least bCc/2 times, and for one of the two
values of θ ∈ {−1, 1}, a cumulative regret of at least bCc is incurred. Since the two θ values are
indistinguishable during these rounds, we conclude that Ω(C) regret is unavoidable.
C.3 Lower Bound for d = k > 2 (Known C)
Here we generalize the argument of the previous subsection to deduce a stronger lower bound with a
joint dependence on d and C. We consider the case that d = k, with ai being the i-th standard basis
vector. Hence, for any θ ∈ Rd, we have 〈ai, θ〉 = θi. We again consider the noiseless setting.
Consider d different bandit instances, the i-th of which has θ = ai. Hence, in the i-th instance, arm
i has reward 1, and the rest have reward zero. In addition, consider an adversary that pushes the
reward of the i-th arm down to zero whenever it is pulled; this can again be done bCc times. Roughly
speaking, the learner can do no better than pull each arm in succession, incurring Ω(Cd) regret.
To make this more precise, note that in the i-th instance, the adversary only runs out of its budget
after the i-th arm is pulled bCc times. However, after ⌊ bCcd2 ⌋ rounds, there must remain at least d2
arms that have not been pulled bCc times. When θ = ai for any i corresponding to one of these d2
arms, the regret incurred is Ω(Cd).
C.4 Lower Bound for Diverse Contexts (Known C)
Finally, we argue that the approach of Section C.2 gives an Ω(C) lower bound on RT even under
the assumption of diverse contexts. Recall that in (13) we consider fixed center points µ1, . . . , µk
and assume that these are perturbed by ξ ∼ D. The following argument holds under any such setup
satisfying the mild assumption that, in each round, a constant positive fraction (e.g., 0.01) of the arms
have regret lower bounded by some positive constant (e.g., 0.01).
We again consider an adversary that pushes the reward to zero (while leaving the random reward
noise unchanged) until the budget is exhausted. Hence, for the first bCc rounds, the learner learns
nothing about θ. The preceding assumption rules out pathological cases such as all arms being
identical, and we conclude that constant regret is incurred per round (with constant probability),
for Ω(C) regret total.
D Attack Methods
Recall that we consider the model Yt = 〈θ,At〉+ t + ct(At), where t is random noise and ct(At)
is the adversarial corruption. In our experiments, we consider four attacks, summarized as follows
Garcelon et al. attack. In an attack proposed in [8], the attacker selects a target arm atarget ∈ A
that it wants to trick the learner into thinking is optimal, and operates as follows: (i) If atarget is
pulled, leave the reward unchanged; (ii) If any other arm is pulled, change the reward so that Yt = ˜t,
with ˜t being artificial random noise generated by the adversary.
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Since our adversary is assumed to know 〈θ,At〉 and t individually, we can alter this attack to remove
the need for artificial noise; instead, in case (ii) above, the adversary shifts 〈θ,At〉 down to zero,
while leaving t unchanged. However, if atarget has a negative reward, then this attack will not make
it appear optimal, so we also allow the adversary to shift down to a more generic value vtarget. In our
experiments, we set vtarget = −1, which is the smallest possible reward.
Of course, the adversary will eventually run out of budget eventually, at which point the attack stops.
The same applies to all of the alternative attacks below.
Oracle MAB attack. Since the adversary has full knowledge of the instance, we can consider the
oracle attack proposed in [11], in which for some target arm atarget, the following is performed: (i)
If atarget is pulled, leave the reward unchanged; (ii) If any other arm a is pulled, shift the reward
down by max{0, 〈θ, a〉 − 〈θ, atarget + 0〉} for some 0 > 0. This means that every other arm looks
0-suboptimal compared to atarget.
Simple θ-based attack. In the contextual setting, fixing a target arm atarget by index (e.g., the first)
may not be the most suitable choice, since the contexts are changing every round. In the setup of
Section 3, we are primarily interested in the case that the perturbations are small, which mitigates
this issue. Nevertheless, when the perturbation variance η becomes large enough, it is likely more
effective for the attack to use a different strategy to choose atarget.
Thus, we propose an attack that tries to make the arm most aligned with some vector θtarget to appear
best. To do this, we simply the above variation of the Garcelon et al. attack, but instead of letting
atarget correspond to a fixed arm index (e.g., the first arm), the attacker updates atarget every round,
choosing atarget = arg maxa∈At〈θtarget, a〉.
Flip-θ attack. This attack simply flips the reward from 〈θ, a〉 to 〈−θ, a〉. This attack can be
considered as highly aggressive, potentially using the budget quickly to the rewards appear to be the
complete opposite of what they really are.
E Additional Experimental Details and Results
E.1 Additional Details
Details of contextual experiment. The synthetic experimental setup of Section 4.2 is detailed as
follows. We generate k = 25 “center points” µ1, . . . , µk (one per arm), each having entries drawn
i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on
[− 1√
d
, 1√
d
]
. The contexts {ai,t}ki=1 at each time t are then
created by letting ai,t = µi + ξi,t, where ξi,t are i.i.d. N
(
0, η
2
d Id
)
for some variance η2 > 0. We
fix the true parameter vector as θ =
(
1√
d
, . . . , 1√
d
)
, and we assume that observations are subject to
N (0, σ2d Id) noise with σ2 = 0.05.
Details of MovieLens experiment. The MovieLens experimental setup of Section 4.2 follows [5],
and is detailed as follows. The data for 1682 movies and 943 users takes the form of an incomplete
matrix R of ratings, where Ri,j is the rating of movie i given by the user j. To impute the missing
rating values, we apply non-negative matrix factorization with d = 15 latent factors. This produces a
feature vector for each movie Mi ∈ Rd and user Uj ∈ Rd. We use 10% of the user data for training,
in which we fit a Gaussian distribution N (U |µ,Σ). The reward for movie i is given by 〈Mi, Uj〉 for
some fixed j.
Changes to the robust PE algorithm. The parameters in Algorithm 1 (e.g., Cˆh and m0) were
chosen for convenience in the theoretical analysis that ignores constants, but we found that alternative
choices are preferable in practice. Accordingly, we run the algorithm with the following modifi-
cations: (i) m0 = d; (ii) Cˆh = min{
√
T , 2log2 T−h}; (iii) the right-hand side of (7) is replaced by
2
√
4d
mh
log
(
1
δ
)
+ 2Cˆhmh
√
4d; (iv) We fix δ = 0.1 and ν = 0.05. Thus, the key changes are removing
the m0 terms from Cˆh, and removing the division by ν in the elimination condition.
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Figure 4: Contextual synthetic experiments: Regret as a function of C with Greedy (Left), LinUCB
(Middle), and Thompson Sampling (Right), under the perturbation levels η = 0.2 (Top) and η = 0.5
(Bottom).
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Figure 5: Non-contextual synthetic experiment with 40 trials: (Top-Left) Average regret as a function
of time; (Remaining) Worst 4 runs among 40.
E.2 Additional Results
Contextual setting: Budget vs. Regret. In Figure 4, we provide analogous plots to Figure 1 (Left)
for all three algorithms (Greedy, LinUCB, and Thompson sampling) and two choices of η (0.2 and
0.5). In all cases, we see a similar linear trend to that of Figure 4.
Non-contextual setting with 40 trials and unknown C. In Figure 5, we provide analogous plots to
Figure 3, but with 40 trials instead of 10, and showing the worst 4 out of 40 curves instead of the
worst 2 out of 10. We observe similar findings to those discussed in Section 4.3
Non-contextual setting with known C. In Figure 6, we provide analogous plots to Figure 3 when
Algorithm 1 is used with known C, with the following modifications similar to the unknown C case:
(i) m0 = d; (ii) the right-hand side of (7) is replaced by 2
√
4d
mh
log
(
1
δ
)
+ Cmh
√
d; (iii) We fix δ = 0.1
and ν = 0.05. The attack is chosen to start during the same epoch as the unknown C case. From the
regret plots, we observe broadly similar behavior to the unknown C case, with the exception that the
regret is considerably lower when there is no attack (i.e., C = 0). This is to be expected, since in the
known C case, knowing that C = 0 means that one can confidently eliminate arms much faster.
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Figure 6: Non-contextual synthetic experiment with 10 trials and known C: (Left) Average regret as
a function of time; (Middle) Worst run among 10; (Right) Second-worst run among 10.
F Additional Related Works
Best of both worlds. The stochastic setting often leads to significantly smaller regret bounds, but at
the expense of potentially restrictive modeling assumptions. Algorithms attaining the best of both
worlds (stochastic and adversarial) [6, 24, 2] are also related to the corruption-tolerant setting, but
consider an unbounded adversary (and a different regret notion) in the adversarial case. Hence, a key
distinction is that the adversary’s budget is “all-or-nothing” rather than being smoothly parametrized
by C. See [22] for further discussion.
Model mismatch and misspecification. A distinct but related direction in the linear bandit literature
has been to address robustness to model mismatch and misspecification [9, 15] (see also [16, Sec. 24.4]
and [28]). In [9], the deviations for each arm are fixed and the same every round, whereas in [15] the
deviations may depend on a context vector but not on the learner’s action. Hence, both can be viewed
as considering a weaker adversary than the present paper. On the other hand, this can lead to stronger
regret guarantees, such as paying essentially no penalty under broad misspecification scenarios [15].
Fractional corruption model. In [13], a different corruption model was considered, both in the case
of independent arms and linear rewards. The constraint on the adversary therein is that at any time t,
at most ηt fraction of the observed rewards have been corrupted by the adversary. This is distinct
from (and complementary to) the setting that we consider, in which the adversary can choose where
to concentrate its budget. The algorithms and bounds of [13] are not applicable in our setting.
Phased elimination. Similar phased elimination algorithms to Algorithm 1 (but without robustness
to adversarial attacks) have been previously considered in various settings, including the standard
setting [16, Ch. 22], misspecified setting [17], and graph bandits [27]. Among these, our algorithm is
most similar to [17], with the main differences being the estimator of θ used, the use of truncation
when selecting arms, and the corruption-tolerant arm elimination rule.
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